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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Professor Kraus’s very interesting paper stresses the importance of cultural environments 
for argumentation. Its main objective is to find out the areas where cultural difference 
plays a role in argumentative communication, to identify types of arguments that are 
culture sensitive and to see how cultural insensitivity may spoil an argument. Though 
mainly dwelling on efficacy, the analysis also raises questions of logical validity, 
examining the fallacious or non-fallacious nature of culture sensitive arguments. Kraus 
defines the latter as arguments “that in their premises touch culture-specific beliefs, 
norms or values and are potentially open to misunderstandings.” 
 
The paper is divided into four major points:  
 
1. Going through the vast literature on the subject of intercultural argumentation, it 
first determines three criteria of cultural diversity (a) values, norms, codes and 
institutions—be they religious, political, ethical or philosophical; (b) elements 
forming the collective memory (myths and history); (c) standards that regulate 
everyday life. (customs, sense of humour, etc.) An argument is culture-sensitive if 
it touches any one of these elements in its premises.  
2. Kraus then provides a taxonomy of possible cases of failures like obscurity, 
irrelevance, insufficiency, strength, backfiring and embarrassment.  
3. He proceeds to see if there are particular arguments forms open to cultural 
sensibility, and deals with standard arguments, arguments from examples, from 
authority, from popular opinion and ad hominem.  
4. He then draws the consequences of globalization for culture sensitive 
arguments—cross-cultural argumentation becoming a permanent task. He 
concludes on the impossibility of being always politically correct by taking into 
account all cultural sensitivities. He also, and more forcefully, concludes that an 
argument that fails as the result of a cultural bias is not by definition a fallacy.  
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The paper thus throws light on the elements building up the cultural aspect of arguments, 
and on the effect they can have on argumentative dialogue. I would like to comment on a 
few points: 
 
1. The problem raised by the very broad criteria of cultural diversity:  to the extent 
that they are based on values, norms, habits, etc. that allow for an agreement on 
the reasonable, are not all arguments cultural, or culture sensitive? 
2. The choice to confine (at least in the definition) cultural aspects of argumentation 
to premises, and the possibility of culture-dependent, alternative argumentations.  
3. The question of political correctness linked to culture sensitivity and the way it 
blinds us to the importance of dissent and conflict in argumentation. 
4. Kraus’s premises for his own research, based on the necessity but also the 
possibility of finding a common ground even when there are cultural 
discrepancies. Can all kinds of differences be bridged? 
 
2. ALL ARGUMENTS ARE CULTURE SENSITIVE 
 
The first question concerns the categories selected to define the “cultural.” Kraus 
shows—and, to my opinion, rightly so—that these categories are very broad and 
encompassing. However, one can wonder whether there is anything beyond what he 
enumerates: values, norms, codes, institutions; collective memory including myth, 
history, and art; language, customs, habits, routines, sense of shame, drinking and eating 
habits, life style. Any argumentation is grounded in language, and cannot develop outside 
its loaded vocabulary, its rich and complex network of notions, its specific ways of 
modeling the surrounding world. It relies on points of agreements, which are described by 
Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca (1969) as facts (or rather what is considered a fact), as 
values and norms, as presumptions drawing on habits and routines. It is framed by 
institutional rules depending on the nature of a country’s regime and constitution. In other 
words, we can wonder whether pre-existing points of agreement are not by necessity 
cultural.  
This derives not only from the nature of doxa as a set of opinions, beliefs and 
values shared by a community that informs the premises of any argumentation (Amossy 
& Sternberg 2002), but also from the substitution by Perelman (1979) of an ideal of 
reasonableness to a logical ideal of rationality. If argumentation has to be founded on 
premises that appear as plausible and acceptable to both arguer and audience, namely, on 
the reasonable, then it necessarily draws on what is accepted by a group or a by a culture. 
The cultural aspect can be overlooked only when the premise appears as self-evident in 
such a way, that its relativity escapes the attention of the arguers and/or the analysts. The 
comparative examples brought by Manfred Kraus amply demonstrate that only 
confrontation with another possibility (another agreement on the reasonable) can throw 
light on the cultural dimension of the argument, otherwise perceived as universal.  
So the question remains to know whether we can distinguish between the a priori 
cultural nature of the argument, and a culture sensitive argument. It seems that the 
cultural aspect of the argument can be more or less conspicuous, but is inescapable, so 
that any argument is potentially open to misunderstandings.  
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From this perspective, however, I would like to argue that the measure to which it 
is open to misunderstanding depends on the target audience, and not on the nature of the 
premises. If the audience, defined as all the people addressed by a specific argumentation 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), shares the cultural premises embedded in the 
discourse, then the argument is not culture sensitive. It becomes so only when is 
overheard or read by an audience for which it was not originally designed. The cultural 
component is in the situation of communication and not in the argument itself. In other 
words, the cultural nature of the premise does not make it by itself culture sensitive.  
 
3. ALTERNATIVE MODES OF REASONING 
 
Though less obvious, my second point nevertheless calls for consideration. Why should 
the cultural component of an argument be confined to its premises? It is true that cultural 
elements are often self-evident and as such, remain implicit. Being part of the doxa on 
which the argument is built, they can be easily observed in premises. However, Kraus’s 
examples show that different cultures promote different types of argumentative moves. In 
examining the argument by example, by authority and ad hominem, he goes beyond his 
initial definition of culture sensitive arguments as “arguments that in their premises touch 
culture specific beliefs, norms and values.” He shows, for instance, that heavy reliance on 
the argument of authority is part of religious cultures. We can see how it affects electoral 
campaigns in Israel, where part of the religious voters follow the instructions of the rabbis 
and not the inclination borne out of their own reasoning as modeled by the current 
political discourse.  
Following this line of thought and expanding it, we can wonder whether there are 
not only of types of arguments obeying the spirit of a given culture, but also alternative, 
culture-dependent modes of reasoning. Could we, for example, define an argumentation 
characteristic of totalitarian regimes, of some kinds of so-called primitive societies—or 
do they lead us beyond the borders of argumentation—meaning that verbal exchanges 
regulated by different cultural laws do not pertain any more to argumentation? 
 
4. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE PROCESS OF ARGUING 
 
Let us shortly proceed to Kraus’s remark on the fact that political correctness, taken to 
extremes, can only stifle argumentation. This would of course be a disastrous effect, since 
our democratic societies are built on the possibility of debate. However, two points can 
be made concerning this issue. First of all, political correctness applies only to the criteria 
of the community addressed by the argumentation, not to by-hearers (eaves-droppers, so 
to say). In other words, the speaker is supposed to respect the sensitivity of the audience 
she is trying to persuade, and not to take into account any sensitivity whatsoever. Second, 
attention given to culture sensitivity that can find its expression in political correctness, 
disregards the fact that argumentation deals by definition with dissent. No social and 
political life is possible without taking into account the conflicts that underlie it and that 
justify in great part the necessity of arguing and of looking for an agreement.  
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5. CAN ALL DIFFERENCES BE BRIDGED? 
 
The last point seems to me particularly interesting insofar as it raises the question of the 
nature and goals of argumentation. It concerns the underlying assumption in Kraus’s text 
that sensitivity to cultural differences in argumentation is the only way to bridge these 
differences and to promote efficacy in the persuasion enterprise. The criteria are practical 
as well as ethical: the goal is to prevent the argumentative dialogue from failure, and to 
build a possibility of understanding between communities. The degree of difficulty 
depends on the extent of cultural differences between the parties. Kraus points out that 
they range from slight to moderate and to radical.  
Concerning the last category, I would like to refer to Marc Angenot’s work on 
cognitive breaks (2006), claiming that today, various groups sharing the same living 
space are feeding on cultural premises so divergent, that they cannot even recognize the 
rationality of the other—they describe it as sheer madness. This is obvious in examples 
like radical Islamists and the Western world, but also according to Angenot, in 19th 
century French political movements and parties like the socialists and the anarchists. The 
dialogue between them (if there is any) can only be of polemical nature, and Angenot 
claims, on the basis of case studies, that in such instances, argumentation turns into a 
dialogue of the deaf. Even if this perspective is less engaging than the attempt at 
elaborating a culture sensitive argumentation able to overcome violent disagreement and 
mutual ignorance, it seems to me that it deserves some thought.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
It thus appears that Manfred Kraus’s paper on culture sensitive arguments raises essential 
questions on issues lying at the heart of our very understanding of argumentation. The 
interest of his work is both in his theses, and in his ability to show how an investigation 
into the role of culture in argument can engage us into a re-consideration of 
argumentation’s nature and goals.  
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